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Recipe for Industrial Policy: Blending
Environmentalism and International Competitiveness
E. Donald Elliott*
T he answer to the question of whether the United States has an in-
dustrial policy is "Yes". It is formed by default by the sum total of
the political decisions that affect the economy.1 Environmentalism, I
will argue, is a very substantial determinant of that industrial policy.
The issue before the house is not really whether we should have an
industrial policy, but to what degree concerns about international com-
petitiveness ought to play a role and be harmonized with our domestic
policy goals and concerns. That is another way of saying that I see
environmentalism' and international competitiveness as two fundamen-
tally different ways of looking at the world, which are, in a sense, in
competition, perhaps in collision.2 Both will shape the goals for our in-
dustrial policy in the next few years. The tension or collision between
these two bodies of thought was first reflected by voices of opposition to
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") coming in
part from the environmental community in the United States. That was
one of the first signs of what is really a deeper and more fundamental
conflict.
I was recently in Ukraine, and heard a story that indicates to me a
part of what the reaction of the environmentalists might be. The story
is set during the Communist years. Apparently a farmer is walking
down a road and several members of the Communist party come up to
him and ask him how committed he is to the Party. He responds that
he is very committed. They inquire as to whether he would give his
tractor for the Party. He says, "Yes, of course." They ask him whether
he would give up his wife for the Party. Again, he responds affirma-
tively. Then they ask about giving up an old cow. He says "No, not at
all". They inquire as to why he is emphatic about not giving up the old
cow. He responds, "Because I have the cow."
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The following text was compiled from the transcript of the remarks made by Professor Elliott
at the Conference.
I One thinks of Camus's point that "No decision is also a decision," or Sheik Yammoni's
remark, "The Americans think that no oil policy is an oil policy."
2 The Danish Bottles case illustrates one such collision. In that case, the European court held
that parts of Denmark's requirements that certain beverages be sold in returnable containers vio-
lated the principle that the restrictive effect on trade should not be disproportionate to the envi-
ronmental objective. Case 302/86 EUR. COURT REP. 4607 (judgment of Sept. 20, 1988).
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The same problem arises for the environmentalists. The environ-
mentalists have had a very fundamental role in determining industrial
policy in the United States in the last two decades. They perceive, per-
haps properly, that their role and their values are increasingly being
threatened by other competing forces which claim that their policy
goals and objectives ought to play a more substantial role in defining
our industrial policy.
I want to talk about the importance of environmental law in
United States industrial policy and, also, what the effect of our current
environmental policies are on international competitiveness. Then I
want to turn to how in the future new legal relationships like those that
will be created by NAFTA will change those policy relationships. Fi-
nally, I want to talk about how I see environmentalism and competi-
tiveness as potentially harmonized in the future.
Let me turn quickly to the question of the importance of environ-
mental regulation on industrial policy in the United States today. A
year or so ago in the Foreword to the annual business issue of the
Wake Forest Law Review, I observed that environmental policy had
become like tax policy in the United States.' That is, no significant
business transaction could be undertaken in the United States without
thorough analysis of the potential environmental implications.
The fact environmental law has a substantial effect on business in
the U.S. is also reflected by information about the aggregate effect of
environmental law and business in the United States. We currently
spend in the United States about a $100 billion dollars a year in the
public and private sector, combined, on environmental compliance. By
the year 2000, based on the laws that have already been passed, that
number will go up to $150 billion.2 That is currently about half the
total cost of government regulation of the economy, just based on envi-
ronmental compliance.3 To put it in perspective it is right in the range
of 2.5 percent of gross national product ("GNP").4 Now, to put that
number in perspective, 2.5 percent of GNP is almost exactly what we
spent on the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe following World War II.
1 E. Donald Elliott, Foreword: A New Style of Ecological Thinking in Environmental Law,
26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1991).
2 E. Donald Elliott, Environmental Law at a Crossroad, 20 No. KY. L. REV. 1, 1 (1992)
(Seibenthaler Lecture).
3 Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and
Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233 (1991); Kirk Victor, Quayle's Quiet Coup, NATIONAL JOUR-
NAL, July 6, 1991 at 1676-77 (About half of the $185 billion annual cost of government regulation
stems from environmental rules; describing operations of the President's Council on
Competitiveness).
4 William K. Reilly, Aiming Before We Shoot: The "Quiet Revolution" in Environmental
Policy, Address Before the National Press Club (Sept. 26, 1990).
' See CLARK CLIFFORD & RICHARD HOLBROOKE, COUNSEL To THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR
195 (1991) (Marshall Plan equal to 2.5% of U.S. GNP).
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Of course, the economy was much smaller then. So, one can think
about environmental regulatory efforts as essentially the equivalent of
an annual Marshall Plan at home to deal with the environment.
By remarking about how large this commitment of social resources
is, I do not by any means want to be mistaken as implying that it is too
large. It is almost exactly the same percent of GNP as Germany and
Japan are spending.6 I think the question is not the aggregate level of
effort, but what are we getting for our money's worth? In that area we
have some very good and also some very poor environmental
expenditures.
I want to turn then to the aggregate effect of environmental regu-
lation on U.S. competitiveness. One issue which has recently been
raised in connection with NAFTA is whether differences in environ-
mental compliance costs in various parts of North America will result
in pollution havens. The concern is that an incentive will be created to
move new enterprises and locate them in areas such as Mexico where
environmental compliance is not as stringent as it is in other parts of
North America.
The analysis of that issue by the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Bush Administration was that the environmental compliance
costs tend to be, for most industries, relatively small by comparison to
other determinants as to where a factory would locate.7 These include
such things as labor costs, proximity, and transportation costs. While
there might be some effect at the margins as a result of differences in
environmental standard, I think that is not the primary way that envi-
ronmental law may effect competitiveness.
Much more of a concern, I think, is the overall problem of the
dead weight loss; that is, 'the type of regulation which imposes a burden
on economic activity, but produces little or nothing in return. In order
to evaluate environmental regulation from that perspective it requires
that we change our traditional conception of looking at what environ-
mental regulation is about.
Many economists have traditionally thought about environmental
regulation as another kind of consumption good. People have a prefer-
ence for a clean environment like they have a preference for broccoli or
sax music. The amount of money that is going into environmental regu-
lation is essentially consumption of a good that people desire.
Increasingly, economists are coming to rethink that way of looking
at environmental protection and think of it much more in terms of pub-
lic investment, just like building a road or some other activity. When
one begins to think of environmental regulation as a public investment
I See Elliott, supra note 1.
7 Review of U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues, Section III.D.2, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, February, 1992.
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it becomes clear that one cannot make a judgment in the aggregate as
to whether or not it is a good or bad investment. It is just like building
a road. If you build a-road to nowhere and it produces very little, then
it is not a particularly good public investment. Similarly with environ-
mental protection. If you invest in a particular environmental regula-
tory matter that prevents more harm in terms of disease and expense
than it costs, then it is a very good investment. On the other hand, if
we spend a great deal of money on a particular program and it pro-
duces very little by way of benefit, then it is not a particularly good
investment.
We have both of those kinds of activities in the environmental
area. One difficulty in terms of applying the cost-benefit framework in
the environmental area is often there are very substantial benefits that
are extremely difficult to quantify. Measurement difficulties in the envi-
ronmental area are really enormous. Nonetheless, there are many envi-
ronmental expenditures that I believe are very clearly justified on a
cost-benefit basis. One example is controlling lead in drinking water.
For each expenditure to reduce the level of lead, one is preventing re-
tardation in children which imposes large costs on society down the
road.
Overall, from the standpoint of this perspective, environmental
regulation shows up pretty well. In 1990 in an article in the Yale Jour-
nal on Regulation, Robert Hahn and John Hird synthesize and review
the literature on the costs and benefits of government regulation. The
article concludes that government regulation of the economy in the
U.S. is costing about $160 billion a year, of which about forty-five bil-
lion dollars is a dead weight loss on the economy.8 That is, in total,
government regulation produces benefits that are forty-five billion dol-
lars a year less than its cost. However, in the environmental health and
safety field, that is not the case. The aggregate, measurable benefits
from environmental health and safety regulation are just about the
same as the costs. It is very difficult for the authors to say there is a
substantial net benefit or that there is a substantial dead weight loss on
the economy. Most of our environmental programs, like the 1990 Clean
Air Act, have estimated benefits from the program and estimated costs
of the program that are just about the same. The comparison is within
the range of uncertainty.
The real problem in the environmental area, as far as dead weight
losses on our competitiveness is concerned, has to do with Superfund
and related cleanup programs. Most of the other environmental pro-
grams are pretty close in terms of costs and benefits.
The University of Tennessee recently projected that if we continue
on our current course with regard to the Superfund Program for clean-
" Hahn & Hird, supra, note 3.
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ing up hazardous waste sites over the next twenty years we will spend
approximately $1.2 trillion for virtually no benefit in terms of public
health.9 Now, just to put that in perspective, the annual output of the
U.S. economy is on the order of five to six trillion dollars a year.
The problem with computing cost-effectiveness with Superfund is
that there are really very few people who are exposed to the waste from
a Superfund site. In addition, at a Superfund site, a very large percent-
age of the risk reduction is bought for a very small percentage of the
costs at the front-end when EPA comes in and does what is called a
"removal". That is where you get rid of the leaking drums and stabilize
the situation. Typically, over ninety percent of the cost comes after that
stage when you do the long-term cleanup, and of that, twenty to thirty
percent is going into the hands of lawyers and consultants. The long-
term, high-cost remediation of Superfund sites produces very little in
terms of public benefit.
There is hope, I think, that this problem, which is really a major
problem for the U.S. environmental effort, generally may receive some
reconsideration in the Clinton Administration. After twelve years in
which the Congress identified that there were no substantial problems
in the Superfund Program and that the source of all problems was sim-
ply poor administration by the Republicans in office, there has suddenly
been a change now that there is a Democrat in the White House. Re-
cently, for example, Congressman Dingell announced that Superfund is
a "waste of taxpayers' money". 10 We have a political opportunity as a
country to really reexamine the quiestion of how much of our limited
natural resources ought to be deployed toward cleanup. The systems
that we currently have for assuring there is some reasonable parity be-
tween costs and benefits in the environmental area do not work particu-
larly well. From discussions with John Howard at this conference, it
appears we have a more substantial effort in that area perhaps than in
Canada, in the sense that we generally have judicial review of environ-
mental decisions. However, judicial review has generally proved rela-
tively ineffective at disciplining the political process in terms of costs
and benefits in the environmental area. That was one reason that the
Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") regulatory review process
was created in the early 1980s; the ineffectiveness of the judicial review
process to control the bureaucracy."1
Despite what you might read in the newspapers, academic studies
of the OMB process which are reflected in a particularly fine book by
' See Robert Hahn, Reshaping Environmental Policy: The Test Case of Hazardous Waste,
2 AMER. ENTERPRISE May/June 1991, at 72, 75.
10 Dingell Expects Drafting of RCRA, Superfund Legislation This Year, Daily Rep. for
Exec. (BNA) No. 75, at D-30 (Apr. 21, 1993).
11 See E. Donald Elliott, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Sha-
piro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523 (1983).
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Kip Viscusi, an economist at Duke, called Fatal Tradeoffs,12 shows
that the OMB regulatory review process has also been relatively inef-
fective at disciplining regulatory action in the environmental area. Vis-
cusi recites that, on average, a regulatory measure in the environmental
area spends about a $145 million per statistical lives saved, which is
about ten to fifteen times greater than the going rate for other expendi-
tures in the economy. So OMB, too, has proved to be relatively ineffec-
tive at balancing a economic and environmental goals.1 3
There have been other political initiatives to try and ensure that
environmental protection achieves a relatively good ratio of costs and
benefits. There has been lots of emphasis in recent years on trying to
develop a better process for ranking risks and comparing environmental
expenditures in terms of the common metric of risk reduction. This
goes back to EPA's Unfinished Business Report that was done in 1987
and which has been updated. Recently, there has been a lot of discus-
sion about trying to focus our environmental expenditures where we
will get the greatest benefits in terms of risk reduction. One of the
great problems in this area is, essentially, that we are a democracy.
Oftentimes, the public perceives the greatest risks far differently than
where the so-called experts see the greatest risks as being. If you rank
environmental risks according to the experts and according to the pub-
lic, they are almost exactly reversed. The public sees the greatest envi-
ronmental risks as being in the hazardous waste and the nuclear field.
The so-called experts see the greatest benefit in terms of risk reduction,
air pollution, water pollution, and perhaps global climate change where
you have large numbers of people exposed.
The conflict between the public and the experts is where I think
the effect of NAFTA really will be felt. Not only NAFTA, but also the
GATT and the developing level of international regulation. In the vol-
ume last year, Michael Hart wrote that the purpose of trade agree-
ments is to essentially regulate governments. 4 I think that Michael's
statement was very insightful. And Robert Hudec, a professor in the
international law area, has written in a forthcoming article even more
pointedly that one of the purposes of international trade agreements is
to change the results that would be reached by domestic legislation
alone.15 It is, according to Hudec, essentially an act of self-paternalism
by a legislature to enter into an international trade agreement and reg-
12 W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
1992.
13 For the author's views on improving the OMB process, see Elliott, TQMing OMB, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming).
" Michael Hart & Sushma Gera, Trade and the Environment: Dialogue of the Deaf or
Scope for Cooperation? 18 CAN-U.S. L.J. 207, 1992.
15 Robert Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotia-
tions, 25 N.Y.U. J. OF INT'L L. & POL. [] (1993).
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ulatory regime. One of its purposes, again according to Hudec, is to
provide an international forum that can question the extreme actions
that are driven by domestic political forces. The domestic political con-
siderations that require the subsidization of farmers in France is an-
other one of those issues. It seems clear to me that NAFTA will essen-
tially provide a series of procedural mechanisms by which some of our
more extreme environmental actions can be questioned in an interna-
tional forum.16
Article 712 of NAFTA provides a mechanism by which measures
that arguably have an adverse effect on international trade within the
North American free trade area can be challenged on the grounds that
they adversely affect trade. The burden is on the party challenging the
measure, and it can be challenged before expert dispute resolution
panels. However, the measure can be upheld if it is found that it is
scientifically necessary for protection of health or the environment.
Consequently, the Article 712 process essentially provides a forum in
which some of our environmental measures are very likely to be chal-
lenged on the grounds that they go well beyond what is really necessary
from a scientific perspective.
There are a number of key procedural issues that will need to be
sorted out before it can be ultimately determined how effective
NAFTA will be at providing this additional check or international re-
view of some of our environmental regulations. One key issue which is
currently in the process of being decided is whether or not individual
companies can actually participate and bring such challenges or
whether or not challenges can only be brought on a government-by-
government basis.
Increasingly in the negotiations concerning the procedure for the
North American Commission on the Environment, we are moving in
the direction of giving individual groups the right to participate.17 It
appears that a mechanism may be agreed upon whereby, for example,
'6 Despite such challenges, Sandy Gaines, Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for
the Environment, contends that "NAFTA itself assures that the United States and state and local
governments can continue to adopt standard legislative and administrative procedures, and apply
firmly and fairly their full arsenal of environmental laws, regulations, and policies." Sandford E.
Gaines, Environmental Laws and Regulations After NAFTA, 1 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 199, 210 (1993).
17 Subsequent to this speech, the final draft of the NAFTA supplemental agreement regard-
ing the environment was issued. The final draft, among other things, provides that "[e]ach Party
shall ensure that persons with a legally recognized interest under its law . . . have appropriate
access to administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the Party's
environmental laws and regulations." North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
Article 6.2., Sept. 13, 1993. Although the final draft does not provide a means for direct private
party challenges to environmental laws and regulations, a private party may petition its govern-
ment to bring such challenges. Whether denial of a petition to challenge a law or regulation would
be subject to judicial review under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act remains an open
question, although a denial would appear to constitute an unreviewable discretionary act. 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(2).
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an individual Canadian company that is exporting agricultural goods to
the United States would have a right to challenge, for example, the
Delaney Clause in U.S. legislation, that says any detectable amount of
a carcinogen in food supplies is illegal, on the grounds that kind of a
rule is overly stringent and, therefore, not necessary from a scientific
perspective. 8
I think these types of challenges are really terribly threatening to
the environmental community in United States. And with good reason.
The international standard which has been articulated both in the
GATT and under NAFTA is one which imagines that environmental
regulation can be justified or can easily be determined to be "scientifi-
cally necessary" or not "scientifically necessary." To an environmental
lawyer, that appears to be a very simplistic perspective when applied in
the environmental area.
One of the difficulties that we have in the environmental area is
that the uncertainty term is usually larger than the data term when we
are evaluating one of these standards. In other words, we also know
very little and, therefore, we have to regulate on a precautionary ba-
sis.19 When we regulate on a precautionary basis we usually deal with
uncertainties by applying our cultural values. These values differ
widely from one society to another. For example, the risks of cancer
that appear quite acceptable to Europeans are risks that systematically
appear unacceptable to Americans. Similarly, in the U.S.-Mexico con-
text there has been ongoing debate between the U.S. and Mexico tuna
fishers over the question of protecting the dolphins.20 Undoubtedly to
the Mexicans, the dolphin must appear to be the American sacred sea
animal. They must find our attitude of protecting the dolphin as
strange as we, for example, find the Hindu attitude of protecting cows.
One of the very difficult areas that will have to be sorted out over
the next twenty years or so is what kind of deference to these various
cultural judgments should be given by international bodies. The diffi-
culties in this area suggest that if there are countries in the world that
still pursue the mercantilist ideal - that is, they pursue the ideal that
the optimum position for a country is to have everyone else pursue a
free trade policy but for my particular country to pursue a protectionist
policy - then environmental standards will provide an ideal area in
which to try to set non-tariff trade barriers because it is very easy to
18 See generally Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting EPA attempt to read
de minimis principal into Delaney clause).
" See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976). On the role of uncertainty in environmental decisions generally, see E. Donald Elliott,
Global Climate and Regulatory Uncertainty, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 259 (1992).
20 For a summary, see Peter Lallas, Daniel Esty & David Van Toogstraten, Environmental
Protection and International Trade: Toward Mutually Supportive Rules & Policies, 6 HARV.
ENvIR. L. REv. 271 (1992).
[Vol. 19:305 1993
Elliott-ENVIRONMENTALISM AND COMPETITIVENESS
try to justify environmental standards in terms of some of these cul-
tural judgments.
Two other key procedural issues will need to be sorted out under
NAFTA, in addition to whether or not individual companies can get
involved in bringing the challenges. The second one may be a Canadian
company challenge to a Canadian standard on the ground that it is too
stringent, or does the NAFTA standard only apply where a company in
one country is challenging a standard in another country. For example,
can a U.S. company challenge regulations implementing the Clean Air
Act on the grounds they go beyond what is scientifically necessary and,
therefore, put .the U.S. company at a disadvantage vis-a-vis its Cana-
dian and Mexico competitors?
A third issue is whether or not this is a one-way street - whether
or not regulations can only be challenged on the grounds they are too
stringent, or could they also be challenged on the grounds that they are
too weak. Can a U.S. company, for example, go in and challenge the
lack of enforcement in Mexico arguing that lack of enforcement is giv-
ing its Mexican competitors an undue advantage? These are, I think,
ultimately some of the kinds of problems that will be confronted as the
issue of environmental regulation ultimately moves from the national
level to a much more international regulatory system.
I am somewhat optimistic that the challenge can be met in a posi-
tive way which harmonizes the goals of environmentalism and competi-
tiveness, and I think that to do that we will have to go to a much more
cooperative and less adversarial approach.
There are some positive trends in that direction which I will review
very briefly. One is moving to a much more market-based and incen-
tive-based approach to regulation which I think is happening world-
wide. My colleague Dick Stewart once wrote that U.S. environmental
protection is the one example in our economy of Soviet-style central
planning.21 It is the case that we allocate use of the environment, which
is a resource, in a bureaucratic way, which is typical of the way many
resources are allocated in a central planning system. Increasingly, we
are getting away from that kind of command and control approach to
regulation and trying to deal much more in incentive-based approaches.
A second trend, which I think is necessary, is greater integration
at the level of government policy. I winced when Deborah Wince-Smith
said this morning that regulatory policy was boring. That really cut me
to the quick. But the fact of'the matter is that the competitive policy of
the Department of Commerce is very rarely coordinated at an early
stage in the process with what EPA is doing, and there are many, many
examples of government policy where activity essentially suffers from
21 Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV.
ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (1985).
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the pursuit of a single objective without really taking into account other
values and the kind of integration and total quality management she
was talking about.2 I think it is something we can do much better
within the governmental area.
Let me give one example. A typical way that we have set environ-
mental standards in the U.S. is on the basis of so-called "best available
control technology," taking into account the economic resources of the
companies that are regulated. I recently realized if you look at that
policy from the standpoint of the competitiveness of particular sectors
on the international stage, this approach is absolutely perverse. What it
says is that we will impose a greater burden of environmental protec-
tion on those sectors that are best able to pay. For example, the chemi-
cal industry, which is one of our few manufacturing industries that is
still competitive on the international scale, as a matter of policy, a
greater proportion of environmental compliance costs are allocated to
that industry as opposed to an industry like the steel industry which is
having a hard time competing. So in a systematic manner, our environ-
mental policies tend to dampen down the success of particular sectors
on the international scale.
Let me just finish with one idea, and that is that, ultimately, I
think environmental protection and competitiveness can be made much
more compatible. This is an idea that goes back to Gifford Pinchot, the
great real inventor of the conservation movement in the United States
and Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of Interior. Pinchot wrote eighty
years ago, "in the great commercial struggle between nations, which
will eventually determine the welfare of all, national efficiency will be
the deciding factor. ' '23
22 See generally Lloyd Cutler & Robert Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
22 GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 50 (1910).
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